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BOOK REVIEW
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE FACTORY
John Franklin Campbell. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.
pp. ix, 292. $6.95.
There are few Americans who in recent years have not sensed
increasingly that our foreign policy and its execution were inadequate. Not only have our relations with the other great powers
been tense or virtually non-existent, as in the case of China, but
we have had few friends among the world's neutral powers as
the result of Viet Nam and our penchant for aligning with and
supporting reactionary regimes throughout the world. At the
same time we have virtually ignored the needs of aspiring, developing countries, paid little attention to the sentiments of the
majority of members of the United Nations, once our support of
the majority held in earlier years was lost, while our allies have
had to stand by, embarrassed and confused, hoping to be consulted, but despairing that their council would receive much
attention in our policy-making process.
Has foreign policy-making always been so clearly deficient?
Is our policy-making system the result of poor constitutional
planning by the Founding Fathers, or is the recent foreign policy
malaise due to inadequate leadership, poor organization, weak
personnel, or simply the relative inexperience of the United
States in behaving as a great world power? These are some of
the questions suggested by this very interesting and provocative
book.
Although the late John Franklin Campbell was clearly aware
of the multiple sources of difficulties in formulating and carrying
out an enlightened and coherent foreign policy, his main theme
in this book is that the weakening and, at times, near total displacement of the Department of State as the chief source of
Presidential guidance is the principal reason for the major mistakes since World War II, culminating in the Viet Nam fiasco.
lie views this displacement as the result of an ideological shift
from "old" to "new" diplomacy after World War II.1 Instead of
concentration on the maintenance of peace through extensive
negotiation, face-saving settlements, and a hands-off attitude
toward the internal affairs of other nations, the 'new" diplomacy
neo-Wilsonian, was based on a world vision encompassing villains
and good guys.
1 Campbell, ch. 2.
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In addition to the ideological shift, State was the victim of
the actions of three men: Franklin Roosevelt, Senator Joseph McCarthy and Henry Wriston. The first virtually ignored State
during World War II, reflecting a long-held distrust of Foreign
Service officers to whom he referred sarcastically as "the profession of perfection."'2 After what Campbell considers a brief
flowering of State, 1947-50, under two strong Secretaries of State,
George Marshall and Dean Acheson, a period of true professionals,
of whom Llewellyn Thompson, Robert Murphy and Foy Kohler
were outstanding examples, the onset of Senator McCarthy's
demagogic attacks destroyed departmental morale and discouraged entrance of gifted young people into State.3 Finally, in
an ironic turn of events, after the Senator from Wisconsin had
done his best to destroy popular confidence in State, Henry
Wriston, president of Brown University, headed a committee
whose report delivered the coup de grace. 4 The hearty influx of
new members to "democratize" the Department and other "reforms" of Wristonization lowered quality while increasing the
number of State Department employees. The effect was to
minimize entry of newcomers and swell the number of those
at senior levels, most of whom entered laterally.5 By the end
of the 1960's, there were some 24,600 personnel on State's payroll, ' with almost half engaged in administrative work. Between 1967 and 1969 there was a drop of nearly 50% in the num7
ber of total applications for the Foreign Service exam.
Only a few of the proposed reforms of State as suggested
by Campbell can be mentioned here.s In addition to a 50%
slash of personnel, he proposes adoption of some of the integrating and coordinating proposals set forth in the Hoover
Commission reports and reports made during the Johnson administration. Essentially, they would provide fewer, and more
respected chiefs supported by younger and more talented indians. The model sought seems to be a pre-war, or pre-World
War II, type of State Department, a small band of wise and
experienced counselors to whom the President and the nation
would turn for foreign policy planning, advising, negotiation,
with confidence that their mistakes would be few, and who
2

Id., 114.

3 Id.,
4 Id.,
5 Id.,
6
7

114 ff.
119 ff.

125.
Id., 133.
Id., 142.

8 Id., 147 ff.
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would help Presidents achieve for the United States a more
successful long-term role in a peaceful international community.
The restoration and improvement of the State Department
by itself could not, in Campbell's opinion, accomplish the
needed reform. What is also necessary is to diminish or eliminate the role of the upstart rivals of State- the military,
normally acting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA,
USIA, DIA, and other operations in the intelligence community,
and the White House office entourage.9 To accomplish all or
any part of this wholesale revision is obviously a tremendous
undertaking. Ignoring for the moment the difficulties presented, one might ask why these rivals of State emerged and
whether Campbell sustains his case for diminishing their role
in foreign policy.
The emergence and flourishing of these ever-growing post
World War II organizations is attributable chiefly to the fears
of President Truman and his successors that the Soviet Union
and a world-wide Communist movement threatened the "free"
world and its self-announced leader- the United States. Viewing the Communist movement as essentially monolithic and
aimed at the overthrow or subversion of free nations, whatever
their political coloration, American leaders thought it essential
to develop a mammoth intelligence apparatus capable of providing detailed information, analyses, and estimates covering
every portion of the world. Each of the services, and State as
well, continued to provide intelligence inputs, but the vast
though undisclosed sums made available to CIA, its huge though
unknown size, and its virtual freedom from effective Congressional scrutiny, gave it strategic primacy in foreign policy
decision making, only weakly countered by the eventual creation of DIA as a joint service intelligence organization to safeguard the viewpoints of the Joint Chiefs and the military
services. Users of CIA reports and estimates have had mixed
reactions over the years of its existence. Over-classification
of materials, pretentious studies of esoteric subjects, commonly
with vague, hedging conclusions, have been all too common.
The cloak of anonymity and the use of numerous investigators
frequently made for pallid, homogenized products, often of
little value to the President and his chief advisors. Yet, much
the same could be said of many of the efforts of the intelligence branches of the services and DIA. Rapid shifting of
9 Id., chs. 6-9.
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personnel, poor allocation of personnel resources, the need to
fall back on the lowest common denominator of agreement
when the services tried to reach a joint agreement, made it
difficult for the armed services to counter-balance CIA. Similarly, the intelligence branch of State frequently found itself
unable to exert substantial influence, in spite of what it considered its greater expertise in world affairs. In some country
or area sectors there might be 'radical differences of opinion
between the lowest working members and the officer who
reported to the Director of Intelligence of State, or he, in turn,
in reporting to the Secretary, but since a position had to be
taken, there was a tendency on many matters to reach agreement all too readily. From sources that seem quite reliable,
there were instances in Washington during the Kennedy administration when the President would summon younger officers in State to give their own, uncensored reports on a particular problem area or current development.' 0
Finally, there was the increasing development around the
President of a coterie of appointed advisors, who, through their
constant availability and enjoyment of Presidential trust, came
to play a collective role in the 60's that was unprecedented and
outside formal American political theory. Supposedly, the Secretary of State should be the President's chief advisor in foreign
affairs. For Truman, the revered General Marshall and a supremely confident Dean Acheson obviated the need for a White
House advisory group. As we learn more about the Eisenhower
years, it is apparent that his secretary, John Foster Dulles,
although allowed to run from place to place, building anti-Communist alliances and hurling challenges to the Soviet Union and
the Communist "conspirators" in other parts of the world, was
constantly pulled up short by Eisenhower whenever he threatened to involve us more deeply in China, Southeast Asia, and
other places where the holy war against Communism might be
fought. The President at least had the acumen to avoid committing land forces to Asiatic wars, though in deference to the "holy
war" ideology he maintained the nation's curious support of Nationalist China, and various United States agents flitted in and
out of the Southeast Asia turbulence of the 50's. In a curious
epilogue, Eisenhower, who appeared largely disinterested in
10 In 1968 after the Tet cffensive in South Viet Nam, a "blue ribbon"

panel of President Johnson's advisors, after being briefed by Secretary Rusk and other hawks, heard the opinions of lower ranking
officials of State, the CIA, and Pentagon, without the presence of their
superiors. As a result the panel recommended that the war be deescalated and negotiation tried. W.L. O'NEILL, COMING APART (1971).
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most world or domestic problems and trends, warned the nation
against the power of the "military-industrial" complex, a warning that was largely lost on his Democratic successors.
There is no need to recapitulate in detail the unfortunate
events of the 1960's. President Kennedy, the son of an isolationist father, spoke eloquently of America's role as defender
of free peoples everywhere. 1 Surrounding himself with pragmatic, tough-minded academicians and intellectuals, he showed
personal sympathy for the developing nations of Africa, and
proposed the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, while on
the other hand allowing a distorted view of World Communism
to justify aligning the United States with reactionary regimes
in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. His supporters
tried, but without much success, to minimize his role in the
Cuban "Bay of Pigs" invasion attempt, but it was under his
leadership that an internal struggle for power in South Viet
Nam was converted into a full scale war between North and
South. Infatuated with counter-insurgency plans and doctrines,
he reportedly insisted over military objections that the green
beret be adopted as the official headpiece of our speciallytrained Viet Cong killers. From the 685 men allowed the
United States by the 1954 Geneva Accord, (which provided also
for an election and possible reunification of North and South
in 1956 - called off by Diem with Eisenhower administration
support because of the certainty of the regime's defeat), the
American presence grew until it consisted of some 17,000 military and 7,000 other specialists by the time of the President's
assassination in November, 1963.
Employing many of his predecessor's tough-minded antiCommunist and anti-revolutionary advisors, President Johnson,
who as Vice-President had made a hawkish report to the President after visiting Southeast Asia, exhibited a fierce determination not to lose a war which represented in his mind, as in
his predecessor's, a crucial confrontation with World Communism. Glossed over by both Presidents, however, was the
relative indifference of China and the Soviet Union to the internal struggle in South Viet Nam before the United States
intervened. Once the United States widened the struggle and
11

For a critical survey of President Kennedy's foreign policy attitudes
and acts see R.J. WALTON, COLD WAR AND CouNTER-REVOLUrION: THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY (1972). This reviewer agrees with
Walton's basic analysis of the Kennedy regime's shortcomings in foreign
policy making, largely concealed by the President's eloquence and the
willingness of the brain-washed American public to blame the Com-

munists for all the nation's foreign difficulties.
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chose to support with arms a series of ineffective and unpopular
leaders in South Viet Nam, the Communist powers, by now
wary adversaries themselves, had little choice but to provide
weapons and other materials to the North, and through the
North, to Southerners opposing the government of South Viet
Nam.
Tonkin Bay, heavy bombings that produced dreadful civilian
casualties in both North and South, devastation of villages,
forests and farms, and American casualties that finally produced an outcry at home, became part of each American's
experience through TV and other media. Gradually, courageous
reporters, and a few newspapers that refused to knuckle under
to the administration, conveyed to at least a substantial number of Americans the true nature of the struggle in Viet Nam,
and the hopelessness of achieving results that might benefit the
people of Southeast Asia or further valid interests of the United
States. The 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic to prevent a revolutionary takeover, an action that had precedents
extending back into the last century, perhaps gave President
Johnson false confidence that all that was needed in Southeast
Asia were more men and more firepower. Urged on by his military advisors and Secretary of Defense supported by his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the hawkish academic, W. W.
Rostow, President Johnson committed more and more men,
money and prestige to the war, while casting scorn on the ever
growing body of academic and other opponents of the war.
When McNamara, his brilliant and one-time supremely confident Secretary of Defense, eventually lost faith in the war
effort, he was eased from office, and replaced with a familiar
face from the Truman era, Clark Clifford, who turned out to
be far less hawkish than anticipated. Finally the disastrous
1968 New Hampshire presidential primary convinced the President that he had lost the confidence of the American people,
who in spite of the Administration's lack of candor and distortion of facts, finally recognized that the discrepancy between
the administration's promises and deeds was too great. Too
2
many men and too much money had been sacrificed in vain.
Johnson's politically astute successor, President Nixon,
promised to end the war, and began to wind down American
1

2 Even if he New York Times version of the PENTAGON PAPERS (Bantam,

1971) is less than impeccable scholarship, it is significant in opening the
eyes of non-academic readers to the strange ways of foreign policymaking and execution in the 60's, and should serve as a text for future
Presidents of "how not to do it."
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ground force participation, thus reducing casualties. His task
was complicated by the need to save face, retain the support
of the anti-Communist militants in the right wing of his own
party, and, if possible, divert attention to other aspects of
foreign affairs that might balance the agony of Viet Nam.
While withdrawing American ground troops, heavy use was
made of air and naval power, and negotiations with the enemy
were begun as part of his overall strategy. Agreement with the
Soviet Union on nuclear weapons was one achievement. Most
astounding was the decision to break with the past and seek
at least a modest accomodation with the Chinese, stunning the
pro-Nationalist China wing of his party as well as Democrats
who had feared the label of "soft" on Communism. In 1972,
with the Russian exit from Egypt, President Nixon achieved
a diplomatic victory in that area and found the Egyptians interested in improving relations with the United States. Compared with the dismal Democratic record in foreign policy during the 1960's, it was a virtuoso performance that the President
and his chief advisor, Henry Kissinger, spread before the American people. While the role of the Secretary of State seemed
diminished, the President also rejected the more extreme military demands, and concentrated on the art and practice of negotiation.
Perhaps only a President with a long and impeccable record as an unrelenting Communist fighter could have taken these
steps without alienating large segments of a public long taught
that to be soft on Communism was equivalent to treason. Instead, there was widespread approval of his individual actions
and overall program that promised to relieve world tensions
and gave hope of ushering in an era of peaceful relations among
the major powers. To some observers it meant a relinquishment
of the role of the United States as world policeman, determined
to smash Communist or leftist regimes, regardless of their nationalist orientation.
This crude survey of some of the leading events in recent
foreign policy may seem only tangentially related to Campbell's
major themes in "The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory." But, to
this reviewer at least, while Campbell makes a good case for
having a smaller number of persons threshing about in foreign
policy matters, it is unlikely that such a reform is likely by
itself to be decisive in improving the way we plan and execute
our relations with the rest of the world.
Unless Congress is prepared to assume a greater, sustained
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role in foreign affairs, a prospect which is possible but unlikely,
the initiative lies with the President who picks his own sources
of advice and chooses from competing proposed courses of action. Whether he values most highly advice from State, the USC,
Joint Chiefs, the CIA, or members of his own staff, will depend
on his affinity for, and confidence in, the analyses and judgments they propose. In other words, one can agree with Campbell's proposal to cut back CIA, USIA, AID, Defense and State
but without any realistic expectation that foreign policy as
made and carried out by President Nixon or any future President will be different, better, or even more orderly.
One way of testing Campbell's proposition that a return
to a smaller foreign affairs establishment will prove highly
beneficial, is to look back to an earlier era when we had a
small defense establishment, no CIA, JCS, AID, USIA and the
State Department, a very modest establishment, presumably
advised President as the need arose-the very model Campbell proposes. Yet, having stood behind the Monroe Doctrine,
with the aid of the British, for most of the 19th Century, the
nation plunged at its end into imperalist ventures in Latin
America, and, through dollar diplomacy, cast a pall upon relations with the Southern Hemisphere that has never dissipated
fully. Three Republican Presidents, McKinley, Roosevelt and
Taft each shared in those ventures. But even Woodrow Wilson,
who, as his biographer Arthur Link concluded, was ill-prepared
to conduct foreign relations,' teamed with the idealistic and
equally ill-prepared Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan,
to intervene in Mexico and other Latin American countries, all
with the best intentions. Essentially, these men, like so many
American political leaders and other opinion shapers of past and
present, were convinced that the United States had achieved
ultimate success in devising and advancing democratic constitutional institutions. Therefore, as Wilson and Bryan saw it,
other, lesser governmental forms of other nations within our
sphere of influence should be replaced whenever appropriate
opportunities appeared. It was simple to delude most Americans
by citing affronts to American citizens, business interests, cruelty of native officials, and other rationalizations. The concept of
American superiority, and a failure to see the world except
through American eyes, gave a peculiar cast to American
ideology which at home stressed, in theory at least, equality of
rights and self-government. These aspects of American foreign
13
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policy have been obscured by the nation's rejection of a European role following World War I, and the belief of many Americans that isolationism had been the traditional American way.
This isolationist impulse was terminated by F.D.R., who was
largely his own Secretary of State. One need not adopt all
of the revisionist's argument to recognize that the President,
believing that European civilization was threatened by GermanItalian expansionist policies, acted to rouse a reluctant nation,
and behaved with less than scrupulous neutrality. In all this,
the President acted with the assistance of a number of close
advisors, such as Harry Hopkins, Averill Harriman and others
unidentified with the professionals in State.
For better or worse, the Constitution and historical practices have given the President powers in shaping foreign policy
that are not explainable by conventional separation-of-powers
theory. The formal agencies that supposedly assist and advise
him lack effective constituencies in the nation (the military
being a possible exception). Thus, while agreeing with Campbell that reorganization and redirection of the various supportive agencies may promote efficiency, it seems doubtful
that there is any way of compelling a President to seek the
best advice, and men, or, if he finds them, to ensure that he
will accept and use them. At least to this reviewer, it is men and
ideas which play the significant part in foreign affairs - organizational forms are of secondary importance.
William M. Beaney*
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